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Abstract 
Many academics, consultants and managers advocate stretch goals to attain superior organizational 
performance. However, existing theory speculates that, although stretch goals may benefit some 
organizations, they are not a ‘rule for riches’ for all organizations. To address this speculation, we use 
two experimental studies to explore the effects on the mean, median, variance, and skewness of 
performance of stretch compared with moderate goals. Participants were assigned moderate or stretch 
goals to manage a widely used business simulation. Compared with moderate goals, stretch goals 
improve performance for a few participants, but many abandon the stretch goals in favor of lower 
self-set goals, or adopt a survival goal when faced with the threat of bankruptcy. Consequently, 
stretch goals generate higher performance variance across organizations and a right-skewed 
performance distribution. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no positive stretch goal main 
effect on performance. Instead, stretch goals compared with moderate goals generate large attainment 
discrepancies that increase willingness to take risks, undermine goal commitment, and generate lower 
risk-adjusted performance. The results provide a richer theoretical and empirical appreciation of how 
stretch goals influence performance. 
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Introduction 
Many managers, consultants and academics advocate the use of stretch goals to boost organizational 
performance (Collins and Porras 1994; Kerr and Landauer 2004; Locke and Latham 2013; Thompson 
et al. 1997). These advocates have influenced the Boards of Directors and the top management teams 
of organizations to move away from goals based on routine adjustments to aspiration levels and, 
instead, to adopt explicit stretch goals for organizational performance (Fuller and Jensen 2010; Hamel 
and Prahalad 1993). Advocates argue that stretch goals improve performance by disrupting 
complacency, promoting new ways of thinking, stimulating search and innovation, energizing 
employees, and guiding effort and persistence (Shinkle 2011 provides a review). 
These arguments are based on two assumptions that are subject to major potential validity threats. 
First, stretch goal advocates extend the generally accepted finding from the managerial psychology 
literature that challenging goals have a positive performance main effect on well structured tasks (for 
reviews of this research see Locke and Latham 1990; Locke and Latham 2013) to claim that stretch 
goals have a positive main effect on organizational performance. There is no empirical evidence or 
theoretical framework to support this generalization. Indeed, goal setting theory is described by Locke 
and Latham (1984) as “a motivational technique that works” but does not constitute a theory 
explaining how goals affect organizational performance. 
Second, the cases illustrating the benefits of stretch goals (for example, Collins and Porras 1994; 
Kerr and Landauer 2004; Peters and Waterman 1982; Slater 1999; Thompson et al. 1997) are selected 
ex-post on the basis of success. Sampling on the dependent variable is a classic source of bias and a 
major internal validity threat. The cases do not constitute a random sample allowing reliable 
generalizations to the populations of organizations from which they were drawn.  
Advocates of stretch goals disregard these two validity threats and claim that adopting stretch 
goals is a ‘rule for riches’ for organizations. Implicitly, if not explicitly, the assumption is that the 
distribution of organizational performance simply shifts to the right, improving performance, without 
significant effect on the variance or skewness of the distribution. If stretch goals only shifted the 
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distribution of expected performance to higher levels, few would argue against them and research 
would be needed only to identify the appropriate levels for stretch goals in different contexts.  
However, by definition, stretch goals are difficult to achieve and are therefore likely to be 
achieved by only a few organizations (Sitkin et al. 2011). The many organizations that fall short will 
experience significant attainment discrepancies. Research shows that managers initially respond to 
attainment discrepancies by engaging in local search for incremental improvements of the current 
strategy (Martin and Mitchell 1998; Stuart and Podolny 1996) and/or in distant search for entirely new 
strategies through risky organizational changes (Greve 1998; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001).  
In complex settings, new strategies often fail and can generate very low performance that 
threatens the organization’s survival. Some managers then adopt low risk survival strategies (Boyle 
and Shapira 2012; March and Shapira 1987, 1992). Other managers adopt self-set aspiration levels 
below the exogenous stretch goals to resolve the attainment discrepancy. This dynamic adjustment 
process continues until the discrepancy is resolved when the self-set aspiration level equals actual 
performance (Lant 1992; Mezias et al. 2002). 
These feedback processes suggest stretch goals, compared with more easily achievable goals, do 
not simply shift the performance distribution to the right. Instead, stretch goals alter the shape of the 
performance distribution. Therefore, in this paper we address the question: What are the effects of 
adopting stretch goals on the mean, variance, and skewness of organizational performance? 
To address this question, we conduct two laboratory experiments employing a widely used, 
realistic business simulation. Participants take the role of senior management leading a start-up in a 
mature industry. We vary goals for financial performance to explore how stretch compared with 
moderate goals affect the performance distribution. In addition, to explain the drivers of these 
outcomes, we estimate the effects of stretch compared with moderate goals on goal commitment and 
willingness to take risk. 
We find that stretch goals are not a rule for riches for all organizations. Instead, they lead to riches 
for a few. The cases used by the advocates to illustrate the success of stretch goals are ex-post 
members of ‘the few.’ The cases should not be used to justify the adoption of stretch goals ex-ante by 
‘the many,’ for whom the adoption of stretch goals reduces risk-adjusted performance. 
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Research on Organizational goals 
Goals or aspiration levels have long played an important role in organization theory (e.g., Cyert and 
March 1963; Simon 1964) and are central to understanding decision making in organizations (Boyle 
and Shapira 2012; Sitkin et al. 2011). Decision makers respond to attainment discrepancies in 
multiple ways, including local search for incremental improvement, distant search for novel strategies, 
aspiration adjustment, and the adoption of survival goals to limit risk when the organization’s survival 
is threatened (Argote and Greve 2007; Lant and Shapira 2008; Lant 1992; Mezias et al. 2002). 
We review the existing research to develop a causal theory that integrates these mechanisms and 
shows the interdependent feedback processes they create. Drawing on this analysis, we develop five 
hypotheses regarding the impact of stretch compared with moderate goals. The first three hypotheses 
specify the effects on expected performance, performance variance, and performance skewness. The 
other two hypotheses examine the effects of stretch goals on goal commitment and risk taking. 
Local and Distant Search 
Local search is defined as the search for solutions in the neighborhood of the current strategy, 
activities, or knowledge (Levinthal and March 1981; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001; Stuart and Podolny 
1996). Decision makers assess the difference between goals and actual performance and are motivated 
to perform at or slightly above their goals (Lant and Shapira 2008). Local search emphasizes 
refinements to and greater efficiency in existing strategies, technologies, and activities.  
Depending on the opportunities for improvement and success in implementation, local search can 
reduce the discrepancy between goals and performance (Levinthal and March 1981). For example, 
Martin and Mitchell (1998) show that local search motivated incumbents in the MRI diagnostic 
imaging equipment industry to introduce designs similar to those in existing products. Similarly, 
Stuart and Podolny (1996) show that patenting activity by semiconductor firms typically concentrated 
in the technological domains where the firm had previously patented. 
In contrast, distant search is characterized by exploration of novel strategies rather than 
incremental improvements on the existing strategy and routines (Levinthal 1997). Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar (2001) show that many companies in the optical disk drive industry explored beyond their 
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current organization and/or technological boundaries. These distant searches had an important impact 
on subsequent technological evolution. In addition, Lant et al. (1992) show that poor performing 
organizations initiated strategic reorientations more frequently than did high performers, providing 
evidence that distant search increases with larger attainment discrepancies. Similarly, Greve (1998) 
shows that larger performance shortfalls relative to historical aspiration levels and peer performance 
increased the probability of strategic change in the radio broadcasting industry. 
The advocates of stretch goals argue that superior, breakthrough performance is unlikely to result 
from local search or incremental improvement. Instead, they urge decision makers to set ambitious 
goals that cannot be achieved using variations on the existing strategies or routines: 
A ‘stretch target’ is one that the organization cannot achieve simply by working a little harder 
or a little smarter. To achieve a stretch target, people have to invent new strategies, new 
incentives — entirely new ways of achieving their purpose. (Rose 2012) 
 
The underlying rationale of stretch goals is that people have an innate desire to be challenged 
and that they will redouble their efforts when they are presented with a seemingly unattainable 
target. (Grinnell 2012) 
 
So, to realize stretch goals, decision makers must try something radically new (Sitkin et al. 2011), 
continuing the search until a strategy is discovered that closes the attainment gap. 
However, distant search, including strategic change, involves taking the risk that the new strategy 
will fail, leading to lower performance (Greve 1998). Indeed, empirical studies show high 
organizational risk taking is related to low subsequent performance relative to aspirations (Bowman 
1982; Bromiley 1991; Bromiley et al. 2001). For example, Bromiley (1991) finds performance below 
the industry average leads to greater risk taking, which results in lower subsequent performance. 
The ruggedness or smoothness of the performance landscape affects how hard it is to develop a 
successful new strategy from locally available information (Rivkin 2000). The greater the number of 
factors conditioning success and the more complex the interactions among them, the more rugged is 
the performance landscape. The more complex the payoff landscape, the higher the cost of distant 
search because it is harder to determine where to jump, reducing the probability of success (Gavetti & 
Levinthal 2002). In addition, delays between the selection of strategies and their impact, the presence 
or absence of nonlinearities, and the number and strength of feedback effects affect how difficult it is 
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to find better strategies (Rahmandad et al. 2009; Sterman 1989, 1994). Because decision makers do 
not know ex-ante the expected returns to search, they frequently over-search, lowering performance 
(Earley et al. 1989). Of course, distant search can be successful. The smoother the landscape and the 
greater the organization’s skill in identifying promising strategies and implementing them 
successfully, the greater the probability that distant search boosts performance.   
Aspiration Level Adaptation and the Survival Reference Point 
Aspiration adaptation is another important dynamic process in the theory of organizational goals. 
Adapting aspiration levels reduces the attainment discrepancy as managers adopt self-set goals below 
the exogenous goals. Over time, this dynamic leads to convergence between current performance and 
the aspiration level (the goal adopted in practice). Instead of continuing to search and learn from 
performance feedback, decision makers judge current performance to be satisfactory.  
Such goal erosion (Forrester 1968, 1975) is common. Lant (1992) finds that participants in a 
management simulation adjust their aspirations in response to performance feedback. In a field study 
of a large financial services company, Mezias et al. (2002) find strong effects on sales targets of the 
previous aspiration level and attainment discrepancy. Jordan and Audia (2012) show that, instead of 
continuing to search and learn from performance feedback, decision makers enhance their self-image 
by assessing current performance as satisfactory.  
Decision makers’ willingness to erode their goals is a negative function of goal commitment, 
defined as the determination to reach a specific goal (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987; Hollenbeck et al. 
1989; Klein et al. 1999; Klein et al. 2001). The practitioner literature on stretch goals highlights the 
role of goal commitment (Collins and Porras 1994), arguing that aggressive goals reset an 
organization’s aspirations, overcoming complacency and motivating both local search for 
improvements and distant search for novel strategies. However, repeated failure to achieve goals 
erodes commitment to exogenously imposed goals, resulting in downward aspiration adaptation 
towards current performance levels (Forrester 1968, 1975; Sterman 2000). 
In the extreme case, when organizational survival is threatened, managers avoid taking additional 
risks and abandon distant search for a radical new strategy (March and Shapira 1987, 1992). 
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Abandoning distant search avoids the risk of choosing an ineffective strategy, decreasing the chance 
of organization failure. While focusing on survival by limiting search may avoid bankruptcy, it can 
also trap the organization near the survival point.  
Stretch goals and organizational performance  
As described above, theory and evidence show that the impact of goals on performance involves 
multiple, interacting nonlinear feedback processes, which we integrate in Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
Consistent with the literature, the attainment discrepancy depends on the decision maker’s 
aspiration level compared to actual performance. Importantly, the exogenous goal for performance 
and the endogenous aspiration level are distinct constructs. The exogenous goal for performance is set 
for decision makers by others, for example, a stretch goal set for managers by the CEO or Board. In 
contrast, the endogenous goal is the goal adopted in practice by the decision makers. 
As described by Forrester (1968, 1975), the endogenous aspiration level is conditioned by both 
the exogenous goal and by past performance as aspirations adapt over time toward actual performance 
(Lant 1992). Following Forrester, the endogenous aspiration level can be modeled as a weighted 
average of (perceived) actual performance and the exogenous goal for performance, with goal 
commitment as the weight. When decision makers are fully committed to the exogenous goal, 
aspirations are unaffected by actual performance. As goal commitment falls, the aspiration level is 
increasingly contingent on past performance. 
The attainment discrepancy creates the balancing “Local Search” feedback, B1, in Figure 1. Faced 
with an attainment discrepancy, managers undertake local search that, if successful, improves 
performance, thus reducing the attainment discrepancy.  
The attainment discrepancy can also lead to distant search for more effective strategies. 
Consistent with the theory and evidence reviewed above, a large attainment discrepancy motivates 
greater willingness to take the risk of engaging in distant search (the positive link between the 
attainment discrepancy and willingness to take risk, and from willingness to take risk to distant 
search). Distant search can be successful or unsuccessful. If successful, the efficacy of the current 
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strategy improves, boosting performance and reducing the attainment discrepancy, forming the 
balancing “Distant Search” feedback, B2. However, when distant search leads to the selection of an 
ineffective strategy, the efficacy of the current strategy falls, increasing the attainment discrepancy 
and pressure to engage in further distant search. The result is the Strategy Churn reinforcing feedback 
(R1), in which low performance leads to still more distant search.  
The probability of selecting an effective strategy determines which of these two feedbacks 
dominates. If the performance landscape is smooth and the organization’s search capabilities are 
strong, the higher the probability that loop B2 dominates and distant search leads to better strategies 
and performance improvement. Alternatively, the more rugged the landscape and the weaker the 
organization’s search capabilities, the higher the probability that loop R1 dominates and the selection 
of poor strategies leads to strategy churn. 
At any point in time, decision makers must choose whether to continue with the current strategy, 
focus on local search for improvements (loop B1), or engage in distant search for a new strategy 
(loops B2 and R1). The relationships between the attainment discrepancy and each type of search are 
likely to be nonlinear because resources, including management attention, are limited. When the 
attainment discrepancy is small, managers are more likely to believe that local search will be 
sufficient to close the gap, reducing the need to engage in risky distant search. However, if managers 
believe the attainment gap is so large it cannot be closed through local search alone, more resources 
will be allocated to distant search.  
The reinforcing “Aspiration Adjustment” feedback, R2, captures the adaptation of goals to recent 
performance as one pathway to close the attainment discrepancy. The strength of that loop is 
moderated by goal commitment, which is governed by the reinforcing “Ties to Exogenous Goal” 
feedback, R3. Large, persistent differences between actual performance and the exogenous goal erode 
commitment to the exogenous goal, which then shifts the aspiration level away from the exogenous 
goal towards actual performance, thus closing the attainment discrepancy. 
Finally, the balancing “Survival Focus” feedback, B3, captures decision makers’ propensity to 
focus on survival when performance is very low. As performance approaches the survival point, the 
growing threat of bankruptcy reduces decision makers’ willingness to engage in distant strategy 
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search. This limits the risk of choosing an ineffective strategy, but also limits the opportunity to 
discover a better strategy. 
Hypotheses regarding the distribution of performance under stretch goals 
Although research on the effects of stretch goals on the distribution of organizational performance is 
limited, scholars have long sought to understand the variance and skewness of performance 
distributions (for example Denrell and Liu 2012; Levinthal 1991; March and Shapira 1992; March 
1991; Simon 1955). Because of the complexity of the feedbacks in Figure 1, it is not obvious how 
stretch goals affect the performance distribution. However, consistent with some prior work, the 
presence of reinforcing feedbacks suggests stretch goals may increase the variance in performance by 
amplifying small initial differences in the attainment discrepancy and lead to a skewed performance 
distribution. For example, Denrell and Liu (2012) investigate the effects of skill, past success, and 
luck on the distribution of performance using both simulation and a laboratory experiment. They 
conclude, “When performance depends on past performance, errors and chance may not average out 
but may be amplified through rich-get-richer [i.e., reinforcing feedback] dynamics…that often 
generate fat-tailed distributions” (Denrell and Liu 2012: 9334). 
Performance Variance. The feedback processes in Figure 1 have major implications for the 
effects of stretch goals on performance variance. When performance is safely above the survival 
reference point, performance below the aspiration level increases willingness to take risk and leads to 
more distant search for novel, untested strategies (Argote and Greve 2007; Bromiley et al. 2001; 
March and Shapira 1987). Stretch compared with moderate goals create larger attainment 
discrepancies and, therefore, higher willingness to take risk (Knight et al. 2001) through more 
extensive search for and trials of new strategies (Bromiley et al. 2001; Greve 1998, 2003). The distant 
search process (feedbacks B1 and R1) generates a wide range of potential strategies with different 
performance payoffs (Siggelkow and Rivkin 2006; Winter et al. 2007). Thus, stretch goals compared 
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with moderate goals should generate higher performance variance across organizations.1  
The reinforcing feedbacks – Strategy Churn R1, Aspiration Adjustment R2, and Ties to 
Exogenous Goal R3 – also increase performance variance by amplifying differences in initial 
conditions and among decision makers. The latter include differences in decision makers’ risk 
preferences, mental models and search heuristics, how they allocate their cognitive and other 
resources between local and distant search as the attainment discrepancy changes, and their propensity 
to erode their commitment to the stretch goals in the face of sustained differences between actual 
performance and the exogenous goal. Thus, the feedback structure in Figure 1 predicts: 
Hypothesis 1: Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals generate higher variance 
in performance. 
Skewness in Performance. Advocates of stretch goals typically assume high commitment to the 
formally assigned (exogenous) goal—that the stretch objective becomes the aspiration level guiding 
managerial behavior. The feedback processes in Fig. 1 suggest more complex dynamics. For 
managers who initially do well relative to the exogenous goal, performance improvement strengthens 
goal commitment, leading to stronger commitment to the goal and motivating additional effort—the 
reinforcing feedback R3 operates as a virtuous cycle. For managers who initially do poorly relative to 
the exogenous goal, however, the large discrepancy can cause goal commitment to erode, weakening 
local and distant search, causing the performance shortfall to persist, and further undermining goal 
commitment—feedback R3 operates as a vicious cycle.  
Such goal erosion is particularly likely in complex environments where distant search frequently 
does not yield superior strategies (Gary and Wood 2011; Rivkin 2000); where it is difficult to 
determine which components of a strategy generate high performance (Fang 2012), and where a 
rugged strategy-performance landscape degrades the efficacy of search heuristics (e.g., Siggelkow and 
Rivkin 2006). In such environments stretch goals are likely to cause large and persistent performance 
shortfalls, eroding goal commitment and leading to downward aspiration adaptation to reduce the 
                                                      
1 The focus here is on performance variance across a large sample of organizations at a particular time rather 
than performance variance over time for particular organizations; an important topic that has been examined in 
prior research (Bromiley 1991; Bromiley et al. 2001; Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1988).  
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attainment discrepancy (Lant 1992; Mezias et al. 2002). Over time, current performance levels 
become the aspiration levels despite the ambition of the stretch goals. Feedback loops R2, and R3 
dominate, undermining the effectiveness of local and distant search (B1, B2). 
In addition, for some decision makers, distant search results in the selection of ineffective 
strategies that reduce performance to the point of threatening the organizational survival. These 
decision makers shift to a survival goal (Boyle and Shapira 2012; March and Shapira 1987, 1992), 
converting a large attainment discrepancy (“I’m falling far short of the assigned goal”) into a small 
positive position (“I’m not dead yet”). Focused on survival (feedback B4), these decision makers 
minimize risk by abandoning distant search. Local search dominates (feedback B1), learning is 
limited, and mental models become rigid (Bromiley 1991; Bromiley et al. 2001; March and Shapira 
1992). Although some still go bankrupt, others survive, trapped close to the survival reference point. 
Consequently, even if managerial ability, risk attitudes, and other attributes are distributed 
normally in the population of decision makers, the feedback processes identified in Figure 1 amplify 
the success of those with the skill or luck to do well, stretching the performance distribution to the 
right, high-performance tail. The erosion of goal commitment and adoption of survival strategies 
truncates the left, low-performance tail of the distribution. These effects combine to generate right-
skewed organizational performance distributions. Formally: 
Hypothesis 2: Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals generate right-skewed 
performance distributions. 
Expected Organizational performance. It is generally accepted in the goal setting literature that 
there is a positive main effect on performance of challenging goals compared with do your best goals 
(see reviews by Locke and Latham 1990, 2013). This assumption underpins recommendations for 
organizations to adopt stretch goals: advocates argue that stretch goals boost performance by 
disrupting complacency, promoting new ways of thinking, and increasing energy (Slater 1999; 
Thompson et al. 1997). 
However, the goal setting literature also finds that the positive goal main effect decreases with 
task complexity (Earley et al. 1989; Wood et al. 1987). In a review, Ordóñez et al. (2009) also argue 
that the beneficial effects of stretch goals have been overstated, commenting that stretch goals can 
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inhibit learning, distort risk preferences, and reduce intrinsic motivation. Sitkin et al. (2011) argue that 
stretch goals reduce the performance of poor performing organizations with limited slack, which, 
paradoxically, are the organizations most likely to adopt stretch goals in an effort to improve. 
Current theory is therefore inconclusive about the performance effect of stretch compared with 
moderate goals. If local and/or distant search are likely to be successful, then stretch goals should 
increase expected performance through the balancing feedback loops Local Search (B1) and Distant 
Search (B2). Alternatively, if low performance erodes goal commitment (Ties to Exogenous Goal, 
R3) and aspiration levels (Aspiration Adjustment, R2), survival threat inhibits distant search (Survival 
Focus, B3), or complexity leads to selection of unsuccessful strategies (Strategy Churn, R1), then 
stretch goals could reduce performance. As a default option, we adopt the generally accepted 
hypothesis of a positive performance effect of stretch compared with moderate organizational goals: 
Hypothesis 3a: Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals increase performance. 
If stretch goals increase the variance in outcomes through reinforcing feedbacks R1, R2 and R3 
(Hypothesis 1), risk-adjusted performance could fall even if stretch goals compared with moderate 
goals increase mean performance. Risk-adjusted performance is frequently operationalized via the 
Sharpe ratio—the ratio of mean performance to its standard deviation (Sharpe 1994). Note that the 
Sharpe ratio is distinct from managerial perceptions about willingness to take risk in subsequent 
decisions. Even if stretch goals boost mean performance compared to moderate goals (i.e., if 
feedbacks B1 and B2 dominate), risk adjusted performance could rise or fall, depending on the change 
in the variance. Consistent with H3a, we adopt the hypothesis of a positive risk-adjusted performance 
main effect for stretch compared with moderate goals: 
Hypothesis 3b: Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals increase risk-adjusted 
performance. 
Figure 2 summarizes the hypothesized effects of stretch compared with moderate goals on the 
distribution of organizational performance. The top panel shows the conventional assumption 
regarding the impact of stretch goals on performance. Specifically, stretch goals shift the performance 
distribution to the right, while leaving the variance and skewness unchanged. The bottom half of 
Figure 2 shows the same hypothetical distribution for moderate goals and an alternative distribution 
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under stretch goals, with higher variance, right-skew, higher expected performance, and higher risk-
adjusted performance resulting from the processes specified in Hypotheses 1, 2, 3a and 3b. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Willingness to Take Risk and Goal Commitment. Next, we explore how stretch goals affect 
willingness to take risk and goal commitment. Stretch compared with moderate goals generate larger 
attainment discrepancies. Large and persistent attainment discrepancies affect willingness to take risk 
through feedbacks Distant Search (B2) and Strategy Churn (R1). Larger attainment discrepancies 
increase the willingness to take risk that comes with greater distant search for new strategies (Greve 
1998; Lant and Shapira 2008) and increase risk taking more generally (Bromiley 1991; Bromiley et 
al. 2001; Larrick et al. 2009). Formally: 
Hypothesis 4: Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals increase willingness to 
take risk. 
As shown by the Ties to Exogenous Goal feedback R3 in Figure 1, large and persistent attainment 
discrepancies undermine goal commitment because decision makers come to believe that the goal is 
not attainable (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987). Goals have no motivational effect if there is no 
commitment to them (Klein et al. 2001). Lower goal commitment leads to greater willingness to erode 
goals until aspirations converge to actual performance (Lant 1992; Mezias et al. 2002). Formally: 
Hypothesis 5: Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals decrease goal 
commitment. 
Methodology 
We test Hypotheses 1-5 through two experiments in which participants manage a simulated 
organization, with random assignment to stretch and moderate goal conditions. Study 1 tests 
Hypotheses 1, 2, 3a, and 3b. Study 2 replicates the tests for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3a, and 3b, and extends 
that analysis to test Hypotheses 4 and 5.  
The Simulated Organization 
The People Express simulation is an interactive, computer-based management simulation of an airline 
operating in a competitive market (Graham et al. 1992). Participants take the role of the senior 
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management of a start-up airline, making quarterly decisions for aircraft orders, hiring, average fare, 
marketing expenditure and service scope. The user interface provides participants multiple reports and 
graphs throughout the simulation to support decision making (see online appendix).  
The simulation is based on a real organization, People Express Airlines, and replicates many 
aspects of the business decision-making environment faced by managers in the actual organization. 
The competitive context includes a large number of interdependent variables with multiple feedback 
effects, time delays, and nonlinear relationships (Graham et al. 1992). These features are characteristic 
of the complex environments managers face when making strategic decisions. The simulation has 
been utilized in previous research (Bakken et al. 1992; Graham et al. 1992), and has been widely used 
in MBA and executive teaching.2 
Growing the simulated start-up airline requires coordinating fleet growth and hiring to maintain 
service quality. Without adequate staffing, growth erodes service quality, driving customers away and 
leading to financial losses. Building a skilled workforce is complicated by hiring and training delays, 
and through the impact of inexperienced employees on service quality, workload, burnout, and 
turnover. The coordination challenge often limits participant success as fleet growth causes service 
quality to fall. As load factor drops, growth must be halted to avoid bankruptcy (Graham et al. 1992). 
Participants 
In Study 1, 134 managers enrolled in an Executive MBA program participated in the simulation as a 
class exercise. They averaged 36 years of age and more than 10 years of work experience. They were 
randomly assigned to 50 teams with two or three members (34 teams of three and 16 teams of two). 
Teams were randomly assigned either a stretch profit goal (n = 25) or moderate profit goal (n = 25). 
There were no differences in performance between groups composed of two or three members. Ten 
teams had time for only two simulation rounds. Another was dropped from the analysis because the 
team made a data entry error. The analyses reported here are based on the 39 remaining teams. 
                                                      
2 The simulation is available from: http://www.strategydynamics.com/microworlds/people-express/. 
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In Study 2, 59 students from a large university participated as individuals in the simulation. 
Participants averaged 22 years of age, and 53 percent were female. Most were undergraduates. 
Eighteen percent were economics majors, 24 percent management majors, with the others majoring in 
other fields. Participants were randomly assigned stretch (n = 30) or moderate (n = 29) profit goals. 
Procedure 
Cumulative net income is adopted as the organizational performance measure for each simulated firm. 
The stretch goal is based on the 90th percentile and the moderate goal is based on the 50th percentile 
performance levels achieved in pilot tests in which decision makers were instructed “Do Your Best to 
maximize Cumulative Net income.”  
In Study 1, teams in the stretch (moderate) goal group were told, “The Board of Directors has set 
your Cumulative Net Income target equal to $315 ($60) million by the end of 10 years. This long term 
growth in profit will deliver the financial results that our shareholders expect.” In terms of ecological 
validity, explicit performance goals, including profit goals, are often set exogenously from the 
perspective of managers.  
Participants were instructed to complete three simulation rounds of 40 quarters each (120 decision 
trials), comprising 30 years of simulated experience. Participants were not provided with any base rate 
performance data. After each trial, participants received outcome feedback on their results for that 
trial plus cumulative performance in all their trials to date. After each round of 40 quarters, the 
simulation was reset to the same initial values and the next round began.  
In Study 2 there are four changes to the procedure followed in Study 1. First, rather than teams, 
each participant managed their simulated firm independently. Second, at the start of each lab session, 
the experimenter read the instructions aloud and participants then spent 25 minutes working through 
introductory exercises to familiarize themselves with the simulation.3 Each participant then received a 
memorandum outlining the performance goals for their simulated firm (see online appendix). After 
reviewing the memorandum, participants completed a questionnaire assessing their goal commitment 
                                                      
3 The exercises are available upon request. 
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and willingness to take risk prior to beginning the first simulation round. The same procedure was 
repeated for the second and third rounds. Third, in addition to the goal for Year 10 (the end of the 
simulation), participants were also assigned cumulative net income goals for each year, starting in 
Year 3. Assigning both short and long-term goals is more effective for complex tasks (Latham and 
Seijts 1999). Fourth, participants were told that they would be paid $5 for participating in the 
experiment plus performance-based bonuses of $2 for each intermediate year (3-9) in which their 
cumulative profit met or exceeded the goal for that year and $6 if they met or exceeded the final goal. 
Participants meeting or exceeding their goals in all years of the three trials earned $65 – a maximum 
of $20 in each of the three rounds of the simulation, plus the $5 participation payment. 
All participants began with identical resources, and the simulation is deterministic. Therefore, any 
differences in performance arise entirely from differences in participants’ decisions. The only 
difference is the goal condition assigned to each participant, isolating the effects of stretch compared 
with moderate goals.  
Measures  
Performance is measured by cumulative net income at the end of the third simulation round. For those 
experiencing bankruptcy (equity falling below zero), we use cumulative net income when bankruptcy 
occurs, which can be negative or positive. 
Willingness to Take Risk and Goal Commitment were both assessed in Study 2 via online 
questionnaire (see online appendix). A six-item, task-specific measure of willingness to take risk in 
the next decision round was developed from well-established measures of perceived risk taking 
(Ganzach et al. 2008; Sitkin and Weingart 1995; Weber et al. 2002). Items included, for example, 
“How much risk will you take in your aircraft purchasing decisions?” A five-item measure of goal 
commitment was adapted from prior research (Klein et al. 2001). Items included, for example, “Quite 
frankly, I don’t care if I achieve the annual goals or not.” Participants were asked to complete the 
questionnaire before each simulation round (i.e., three times in total).  
All hypotheses were tested using results for the third simulation round. A learning phase is 
frequently added to experimental studies when a complex task is not familiar to participants. The first 
Stretch Goals & Performance Distribution 
16 
two learning rounds provide participants with an opportunity to get familiar with the user interface 
and the decisions they will make, and to build their understanding of the simulated competitive 
environment, which should help them achieve higher performance in the final round. 
Results 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of performance for Studies 1 (top panel) and 2 (bottom panel) in Year 
10 for moderate and stretch goals. Visual inspection of the performance distributions for the stretch 
goal conditions in both studies shows higher variance than in the moderate goal conditions, and the 
stretch goal distributions also appear to be right-skewed.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
Hypothesis 1 is assessed with the Levene test for equality of variances between the stretch and 
moderate goal groups for Year 10 of the simulation. The Levene test does not require normality of the 
underlying data.  Hypothesis 1, Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals generate higher 
variance in performance, is supported. In Study 1 those assigned stretch compared with moderate 
goals exhibit significantly higher performance variance (SD = $219 million vs. $113 million: L[1, 37] 
= 8.29, p < .01). In Study 2, participants assigned stretch goals exhibit significantly higher 
performance variance (SD = $526.6 million versus SD = $114.5 million; L[1, 57] = 13.15, p < .01). 
To test Hypothesis 2, we use the robust Jarque-Bera test to assess the skewness of the 
performance distribution (Gelade et al. 2015). Hypothesis 2, Stretch organizational goals generate 
right-skewed performance distributions, is supported. In Study 1, the performance distribution for 
stretch goals is right-skewed (Jarque-Bera T = 12.88, p = .000). In contrast, the performance 
distribution for moderate goals in Study 1 is not skewed (Jarque-Bera T = .18, p = .67). Similarly, in 
Study 2 the performance distribution for the stretch goal condition is right-skewed (Jarque-Bera T = 
4.90, p = .03), but is not skewed under moderate goals (Jarque-Bera T = 0.00, p = 1.00).   
To test Hypothesis 3a we examine differences in both mean and median performance. In highly 
skewed distributions, median performance is a more appropriate measure of central tendency than 
mean performance because the median is less influenced by extreme outcomes. The Mann-Whitney 
nonparametric test does not require a normal distribution and, for continuous response variables, tests 
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for a statistically significant difference in medians. We also test for differences in mean performance 
between the two goal conditions with a t-test on the log of performance to reduce skew. 
Hypothesis 3a, Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals increase performance, is 
not supported. In Study 1, neither median nor mean cumulative profit under stretch goals ($6 million 
and $144 million, respectively) are statistically significantly different from the moderate goal 
condition (mean $120 million and median $112 million): Mann-Whitney’s U = 180.00, z = -0.25, p = 
.81 and t = 0.73, p = 0.47). The results are the same in Study 2, where median and mean cumulative 
profit under stretch goals ($185 million and $362 million, respectively) are not statistically 
significantly different from the moderate goal condition ($138 million and $149 million, 
respectively): Mann-Whitney’s U = 348.0, z = -1.32, p = 0.19 and t = -0.58, p = 0.56).  The results 
show no positive main effect of stretch goals on either median or mean performance. 
To assess Hypothesis 3b, we calculate the Sharpe ratio: the ratio of mean performance to the 
standard deviation for all participants in each condition. The Sharpe ratio is widely used in empirical 
finance to assess risk-adjusted performance (Sharpe 1994). We evaluate the null hypothesis that the 
Sharpe ratios are equal in the two goal conditions by estimating the 95% confidence interval of the 
difference between the two ratios from 5,000 bootstrapping samples. 
Hypothesis 3b, Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals increase risk-adjusted 
performance, is not supported. In Study 1, the Sharpe Ratio for the stretch goal condition is 0.66 
compared with 1.00 for the moderate goal condition. The difference between the Sharpe Ratios is not 
significant (Δ = 0.334, p = 0.19, two-tailed test). In Study 2, the Sharpe Ratio for the stretch goal 
group is 0.67 compared with 1.31 for the moderate goal group, a statistically significant difference (Δ 
= 0.595, p = 0.02, two-tailed test). Contrary to Hypothesis 3b, stretch compared with moderate goals 
decrease risk-adjusted performance—the opposite of the direction hypothesized. 
Hypothesis 4, Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals increase willingness to take 
risk, is supported. Figure 4 shows mean willingness to take risk for the moderate and stretch goal 
conditions prior to each of the three simulation rounds. Willingness to take risk for those in the stretch 
goal condition prior to the third simulation round is higher than for those in the moderate goal 
condition (stretch goals: µ = 6.24; moderate goals: µ = 4.39; t(57) = -3.11, p < 0.01).  
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[Insert Figure 4] 
Hypothesis 5, Stretch compared with moderate organizational goals decrease goal commitment, 
is supported. Figure 5 shows mean goal commitment for the moderate and stretch goal conditions 
prior to each of the three simulation rounds. Prior to Round 1, goal commitment is the same for both 
groups (stretch goals: µ = 5.39; moderate goals: µ = 5.75; t(57) = 1.22, p = 0.23). Goal commitment 
declines during Rounds 1 and 2 for those assigned stretch goals. Prior to the third simulation round, 
goal commitment for decision makers assigned stretch compared with moderate goals is significantly 
lower (stretch goals: µ = 3.99; moderate goals: µ = 6.12; t(57) = 4.18, p < 0.001). 
[Insert Figure 5] 
We also tested the prediction that low performance relative to exogenous goals erodes goal 
commitment by estimating a regression model with the deviation from the exogenous goal as a 
predictor of goal commitment: Cr=3 = b0 + b1(G – Pr=2) + ε, where Cr=3 is commitment to the 
exogenous goal prior to round 3, G is the exogenous goal for cumulative profit at the end of the round, 
and Pr=2 is actual cumulative net income achieved at the end of round 2. The model is significant (R2 = 
0.28, F = 23.59, p = .000). As expected, the coefficient for the deviation from exogenous goal is 
negative and significant (b1 = -.003, p = .000). Participants who perform poorly relative to the 
exogenously assigned goal decrease their commitment to that goal. A one standard deviation increase 
in the performance shortfall decreases goal commitment by 1.2 (on a scale from 0-10). 
Additional analysis 
To further investigate the causal model in Figure 1, we examine whether stretch compared with 
moderate goals lead to different levels of the attainment discrepancy, endogenous aspirations, local 
search, and distant search. We infer endogenous aspirations using our measure of goal commitment, 
and therefore examine these relationships using the data from Study 2.   
The causal model (Figure 1) predicts stretch goals will lead to higher endogenous aspiration levels 
and higher attainment discrepancy compared to moderate goals. The attainment discrepancy, D, is the 
endogenous aspiration level, P*, less actual performance, P:  Dr = P*r – Pr. To infer endogenous 
aspiration levels, we use Forrester’s (1968) model in which the aspiration level is a weighted average 
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of the exogenous goal and historical performance:  P*r = CrG + (1 – Cr)H, where C is commitment to 
the exogenous goal, G is the exogenous goal at the end of the round, and H is historical performance. 
Consistent with prior research (Forrester 1968), historical performance is modeled as an exponentially 
weighted moving average of past performance: Hr = Hr-1 + α(Pr-1 – Hr-1), where α is the fractional 
adjustment rate.4 
As expected, MANOVA shows the inferred endogenous aspiration levels between the two goal 
conditions are significantly different: the mean inferred aspiration levels are $438 million for the 
stretch condition versus $117 million for the moderate goal condition (F = 99.68, p = .000). 
However, further investigation provides a more nuanced insight into the dynamics of goal 
adaptation. Moderate goals are easier to achieve, so goal commitment for these participants remains 
high, limiting goal erosion: the difference between the exogenous goal and mean imputed aspiration 
level is $26 million (18% below the goal). In contrast, under stretch goals, the large initial shortfall in 
performance relative to the exogenous goal undermines goal commitment, leading to the adoption of 
self-set goals closer to actual performance: the difference between the exogenous goal and mean 
imputed aspiration level is $382 million (47% below the goal). While those in the stretch goal 
condition eroded their endogenous aspiration levels far more than those in the moderate goal 
condition, the aspiration levels for those assigned stretch compared with moderate goals remain 
significantly higher prior to round 3. Also, MANOVA shows that stretch compared with moderate 
goals result in significantly higher attainment discrepancy (F = 74.68, p = .000) prior to round 3. This 
is consistent with the causal model. Higher endogenous aspiration levels lead to higher attainment 
discrepancy for those assigned stretch goals. 
Turning to local and distant search, we operationalized distant search as the number of decisions 
in a given quarter that changed by more than 30% compared with the previous quarter. Changes in 
any of the five decisions (aircraft orders, hiring, fares, marketing expenditure and service scope) are 
counted. Local search is operationalized as the average number of decisions in a given quarter 
                                                      
4 Since H is not observed, the adjustment rate α cannot be estimated. We assume α = 1, which means Hr = Pr-1. 
The results are robust to other values. 
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changed more than zero but no more than 30%. To compare those who completed the full round (40 
quarters) with those who experienced bankruptcy, we average the totals over the number of quarters 
completed. The causal model implies that stretch goals, by creating larger attainment discrepancies, 
motivate greater willingness to take risks, increasing distant search. Indeed, MANOVA shows stretch 
goals lead to significantly higher levels of distant search (F = 12.23, p = 0.001). Also consistent with 
the causal model, MANOVA shows no significant differences in local search between the two goal 
conditions (F = .01, p = .91): although rising attainment discrepancies motivate local search, the very 
large attainment discrepancies induced by stretch goals lead to a shift from local to distant search.  
Discussion 
This paper makes three contributions to research on organizational goals. First, the paper provides a 
theoretical framework integrating different concepts and empirical relationships that moderate the 
interactions between goals and performance. These include the motivational effects of stretch goals 
(Locke and Latham 2013), local and distant strategy search (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001), goal 
commitment (Klein et al. 2001), managerial intentions to take risk (Ganzach et al. 2008; Sitkin and 
Weingart 1995), performance variation (Bromiley et al. 2001; Hu et al. 2011), aspiration level 
adjustments (Lant 1992; Mezias et al. 2002), and the effect of the survival reference point (Boyle and 
Shapira 2012; March and Shapira 1987, 1992). Our efforts to develop an integrated theoretical 
framework respond to calls by scholars for research that assesses how these constructs interact and 
empirically tests the conventional wisdom (Hu et al. 2011). The causal theory in Fig. 1 shows how 
these multiple, interdependent feedback effects influence performance over time. 
Second, studies 1 and 2 show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, stretch compared with 
moderate goals do not increase performance for the average or median organization (Hypothesis 3a is 
rejected) and decrease risk-adjusted performance (the opposite of Hypothesis 3b). Also, compared 
with moderate goals, stretch goals increase the variance in organizational performance (Hypothesis 1) 
and the skewness of organizational performance (Hypothesis 2).  
We find no positive main effect of stretch goals on performance because only a few performers 
meet or exceed the stretch goals – 19 percent in Study 1 and 13 percent in Study 2 – with the rest 
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ending up either far below the stretch goals or near bankruptcy. Participants in the middle, who are far 
below the stretch goals, eroded their endogenous aspiration levels until they converged with actual 
performance (Lant 1992; Mezias et al. 2002). At that point, there was no attainment discrepancy and 
performance stabilized. The group of low performers who go bankrupt or achieve performance just 
above bankruptcy sought to reduce risk taking by limiting search to local, incremental changes (Boyle 
and Shapira 2012; March and Shapira 1987, 1992). Most of these low performers remain trapped in 
the low performance region; some go bankrupt despite abandoning distant search.  
Our results are consistent with the simulations reported by Hu et al. (2011) connecting ambitious 
(i.e., stretch goal) strategies and ex ante risk taking. Similar to the Hu et al. simulations, our 
experiments show that that stretch goals initially generate large attainment discrepancies that motivate 
distant search. However, in the long run, many of these decision makers fail, or end up near the 
survival point and limit subsequent risk taking. This traps many of them in the low performance 
region. Our findings extend the Hu et al. (2011) results by highlighting another long run response to 
stretch goals: downward aspiration adjustment towards actual performance. Goal erosion was not 
included in the Hu et al. simulation model because the focal firm’s historical performance was 
replaced by the performance of a reference group (either the top 10% of firms, the industry average, 
or the group performing just above the focal firm).  
Advocates of stretch goals also implicitly assume that the variance in and skewness of the 
outcome distribution remain constant. Contrary to the assumption of constant performance variance in 
goal setting theory (see review by Locke and Latham 1990), our results show this assumption is 
invalid. The findings support speculations by Mosakowski (1998) and Sitkin et al. (2011) that stretch 
goals benefit some organizations but not others. Variance in performance is an endogenous outcome 
of complex feedbacks among explicit goals, goal commitment, local and distant search, survival threat 
and other factors. It should not be treated as errors distributed around a goal main effect. 
Of course, higher performance variance could be attractive if the positive performance main 
effect is large enough. Risk-seeking investors prefer more volatility in returns in exchange for higher 
average return. However, the results show that stretch goals do not lead to higher expected 
performance or higher risk-adjusted performance. Instead, Study 2 shows stretch goals generate a 
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significant reduction in risk-adjusted performance. Risk-adjusted performance in Study 1 was also 
lower for stretch compared with moderate goals, although the difference in performance is non-
significant.5  
These results test and extend Mosakowski’s (1998) theoretical analysis that questions whether 
stretch goals are a rule for riches for organizations. In both Studies 1 and 2, stretch goals generate 
riches for the few. The few high performers in the stretch goal condition identify and successfully 
execute profitable growth strategies. These strategies are hard to discover in dynamic environments 
characterized by time delays, feedback effects, nonlinearities, and combinatorial complexity (Gary 
and Wood 2011; Rivkin 2000). Only the top 19 percent in Study 1 and 13 percent in Study 2 achieve 
or nearly achieve the stretch goals. In contrast, for the vast majority, stretch goals frequently lead to 
strategy churn, low performance and erosion of goal commitment, and, in the extreme case, to 
survival threats that undermine the search for new strategies.  
The third contribution extends prior theory by proposing and testing specific mechanisms that 
lead to the observed empirical results. The causal diagram in Figure 1 shows multiple interacting 
feedback loops that explain how stretch goals affect the first three moments of the performance 
distribution. Although Studies 1 and 2 were not designed to test each relationship in Figure 1, the 
results provide support for many of the proposed causal mechanisms.  
The individual mechanisms in Figure 1 are not new in the literature. However, they have not 
been integrated into a single theoretical framework and many have not been tested empirically. We 
synthesized the mechanisms examined in prior work, showing how they interact to create multiple 
reinforcing and balancing feedback processes that interact nonlinearly with each other and with the 
complexity of the task environment to influence the effects of stretch goals on performance.  
The interactions among these feedback processes in Figure 1 explain how stretch goals generate 
a right-skewed performance distribution. This is a novel finding in the literature on organizational 
                                                      
5 The stronger results in Study 2 may be at least partially due to differences in risk-taking behavior of 
individuals versus groups; groups are typically more risk averse than individuals (Masclet et al. 2009). 
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goals. It builds on and generalizes research that shows rich-get-richer reinforcing feedback processes 
lead to right-skewed performance distributions (Denrell and Liu 2012).  
Figure 1 also shows how shifting to a survival goal curtails risk taking and increases the 
likelihood of becoming trapped near the survival point (Boyle and Shapira 2012). In this way, the 
survival mechanism plays an important role in determining the shape of the performance distribution. 
If decision makers did not care about organization survival, the large and persistent attainment 
discrepancies created by stretch goals would lead to greater risk taking and more bankruptcies. 
Performance variance would still increase but the distribution would be more symmetric.  
Implications for Practice 
Our findings have three implications for practice. First, motivated by a few highly successful cases, 
Boards and CEOs of publicly listed companies increasingly adopt stretch goals for financial 
performance. Two quotes illustrate the sentiment. 
"Organization experience has demonstrated, the intelligent use of difficult or stretch goals can 
dramatically improve productivity, efficiency, and profitability" (Kerr and Landauer 2004: p. 
134). 
 
“It [setting stretch goals] doesn’t mean that we know how we are going to get there, but at least 
we’ve got every human factor lined up and trying to achieve the targeted goal” (Denning 2012). 
 
The results of both studies 1 and 2 highlight the attraction of stretch goals. The performance of the 
few who adopt stretch goals and are successful are likely to be very salient compared with the 
performance of others. For example, the top 20 percent of performers in the stretch goal condition in 
Study 2 achieved average cumulative net income (µ = $952.85 million) nearly a factor of eight greater 
than the average performance of the others in the stretch goal condition (µ = $120.37 million). The 
argument that successful cases are evidence for the efficacy of stretch goals is subject to the major 
validity threat of sampling on success ex-post, and then generalizing from a small, non-random 
sample to the population of organizations adopting stretch goals. This would be equivalent to 
selecting the top 20 percent of participants in Studies 1 and 2 ex post, while ignoring the rest, to 
demonstrate the benefits of stretch goals.  
Second, instead of being evidence that organizations should adopt stretch goals, the small number 
of successful cases held up as exemplars for the benefits of stretch goals is evidence that stretch goals 
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are not a rule for riches for all organizations. Instead, they may enrich a few, while many more do not 
benefit or suffer. Without knowledge of the impact of different goal levels on the distribution of 
performance, it is not possible for managers to make informed decisions about the appropriate level of 
the goals that they should set for their organizations. The problem is compounded by the fact that 
people are unrealistically optimistic about their position in a distribution of peers on almost any 
positive trait or ability (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986).  
Third, the findings inform the issue of setting appropriate goals for specific contexts. In 
particular, the results show that whether boards or top management should impose stretch goals on 
their organization depends on their attitudes towards risk. Those with large appetites for risk may still 
prefer stretch goals. However, for those who are risk-neutral or risk averse, stretch goals may not be 
desirable because the increase in performance variance – including the risk of failure – and the lower 
risk-adjusted return achieved by the typical organization outweigh the chances for improvement 
achieved by a few successful high performers. 
In some situations stretch goals that lead to only a small number of highly successful 
organizations may be desirable. In venture capital or private equity, the value created by big winners, 
for example Apple and Amazon.com, can more than offset the poor returns or losses on the majority 
of organizations in the portfolio. In other settings, the higher risks associated with stretch goals are not 
appropriate. For example, stretch goals may not be appropriate in a medium-sized family-owned 
business that constitutes the majority of the family’s net worth.  
Preference for stretch versus moderate goals may also be contingent on the nature of the market. 
In markets characterized by reinforcing feedbacks, such as increasing returns, that lead to winner-
take-all dynamics (Sterman 2000, Ch. 10), stretch goals may prove the only path to success:  firms 
must “go for broke or die trying.” However, in markets where multiple firms can coexist, the risks of 
failure due to stretch goals may dominate, and the watchword should be “live and let live.” 
These arguments show how the appropriate aggressiveness of goals depends on the context. In 
favorable markets, for example those with less rugged performance landscapes or high munificence, 
search for high performing strategies could be successful and bankruptcy unlikely (Denrell and March 
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2001). In contrast, distant search for high performing strategies in markets characterized by rugged 
performance landscapes is more likely to result in lower performance for most organizations.  
Stretch goals may also shape the behavior of the individuals in organizations that then affect 
organizational outcomes. For example, increased variance and thus a more visible upper tail of high 
performers could serve as exemplars of success, motivating others in the organization to strive for 
higher performance, or lead to jealousy, the threat of being perceived as low-performing compared to 
a few stars, or other emotions that disrupt collaboration and the pursuit of organizational goals in 
favor of individual goals. These internal organizational effects would also depend on the structure of 
the internal organizational market. If one big hit is much better internally (e.g., through financial 
rewards and career advancement) than five moderate outcomes, then managers may want to go for 
stretch goals. In situations where extreme effort and risk are subject to decreasing returns or the 
consequences of failure to meet targets is large, then stretch goals would be problematic. 
Which of these possible individual impacts dominates depends on who carries the increased risk 
created by stretch goals. Boards and shareholders are unlikely to accept repeated failure by the CEO 
to achieve stretch goals. So, with 80% or more failing to achieve the stretch goals, do stretch goals 
increase CEO turnover? Similarly, if the CEO of a multi-business organization sets stretch goals for 
the division heads, how does the CEO hold them accountable, without becoming subject to the high 
cost of executive churn? 
Limitations and Extensions 
Like all studies, our study has limitations. First, we tested only two goal levels: stretch and moderate 
goals. However, organizations adopt goals that span the continuum from easy, through stretch, to, 
perhaps, impossibly difficult goals. We also held market conditions and context constant. Future 
research can explore more gradations in goals and different market and industry contexts, including 
variations in the complexity of the environment.  
Second, we manipulated only one type of goal: cumulative profit. In practice, managers face 
multiple goals, such as profit, growth, share price and market share (Short and Palmer 2003). Multiple 
goals require tradeoffs among resources including managerial attention (Ethiraj and Levinthal 2009). 
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It seems unlikely the additional complexity of multiple goals compared to a single goal would 
generate a positive stretch goal main effect, but research should confirm this. Also, the effects of 
stretch goals on different outcome measures, such as idea generation, should be examined. 
Third, the goals participants faced in our experiments were fixed. Participants who fell behind 
early in a round faced a more difficult situation than those who did well early. In many organizations, 
goals are adaptive (Mezias et al. 2002). If boards or CEOs impose stretch goals that prove so difficult 
that they undermine goal commitment, they, or their successors, may choose to lower those goals, 
hoping that more realistic goals would improve performance by preventing large attainment 
discrepancies from eroding goal commitment and morale or lead to the adoption of risky new 
strategies or other actions that harm performance. Alternatively, however, adaptive high-level goals 
could lead to underperformance through goal erosion (Sterman 2000, Ch. 15).   
Fourth, each participant worked independently and did not receive feedback on the performance 
of others. In reality, firms frequently compare themselves to the performance of similar firms in their 
industry. Including social comparisons in aspirations adjustments would be a useful extension of our 
theoretical framework and could be tested experimentally in future research.  
Fifth, although Hypotheses 4 and 5 are supported and the additional analysis reported for Study 2 
is consistent with the causal theory we offer to explain the effects of stretch goals, further research is 
needed to explore these feedbacks, including nonlinearities that affect which feedbacks dominate the 
dynamics of the system and how they are conditioned by individual and contextual factors. 
Finally, stretch goals may lead to other unintended, harmful effects, including capability traps 
(Repenning and Sterman 2002), corrosion of organization culture, unethical behavior and illegal 
activity (Ordóñez et al. 2009), and burnout, mental illness and even suicide. Examples abound, and 
we urge scholars to undertake research to explore them. 
Notwithstanding these opportunities for additional research, the results show that the effects of 
stretch goals are more complex than previous research indicates, and subject to more caveats and 
nuances than many practitioner advocates of stretch goals acknowledge. At the very least, decision 
makers should not simply assume that stretch goals significantly increase performance, but may also 
expose organizations, and those who work in them, to unintended, negative consequences. 
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Figure 3 Panel A: Study 1 performance distribution at the end of Year 10 for Stretch and Moderate Goal Conditions 
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Sharpe Ratio 1.31 0.67
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